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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
Expanding the Scope of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's
Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable
Criminal Activity
I. INTRODUCTION
Profound and radical changes have occurred in landlord-ten-
ant law over the past two decades. One of the most significant
trends in this area has been the judicial and legislative recognition
of the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases." Real-
izing that the primary interest of today's urban tenants is not in
the land but in "a well known package of goods and services,"'2
1. A majority of states recognize the implied warranty, either by statute or by judicial
decision. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-.380 (1979); ARiz. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1324 to -1364
(1974); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1, 1941.2, 1942 (West Supp. 1980); Green v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974) (en banc); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 47a-7 to -12 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1975); Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51, .55, .56 (West 1979); (Georgia) GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-111, -112 (1979);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 521-42 (1976); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IMI. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 383.595, .625, .635, .640, .645, .655 (Supp. 1980); ME. RE V. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (West Supp. 1980); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139
(Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1980); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1419, -1425 (1976); NEV. REv. STAT. §§
118A.290, .360 (1979); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino,
63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (Consol. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
5321.04 (Page Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.770, .800 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-5501 to -5505 (1977) (applies to major cities only); Kainarath
v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4859 (1973); VA. CODE §§
55-248.13, .23, .25 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.060, .090, .100 (West Supp.
1980), Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07
(West 1979); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
2. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); see text accompanying note 42 infra.
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courts have increasingly imposed a duty on landlords to maintain
the leased premises in a habitable condition, making the landlord
responsible for the repair of latent and even patent defects.3 Al-
though the warranty standard is typically fixed by reference to the
relevant housing code,4 some jurisdictions have articulated more
flexible standards, such as whether the premises are "habitable
and fit for living' 5 and whether the defect adversely affects "safety
and sanitation."6 Thus, some courts have defined the warranty
broadly enough to include cases in which there is no technical vio-
lation of any housing code provision.7
In a parallel development, the increasing incidence of urban
crime8 and the rapid proliferation of multifamily dwellings9 have
prompted courts to abandon the general rule that a landlord owes
no duty to protect his tenants from criminal acts committed by
third parties on the leased premises.10 These recent cases have re-
lied overwhelmingly upon traditional tort concepts of duty, fore-
seeability, and proximate cause in recognizing the landlord's re-
sponsibility for protecting his tenants from reasonably foreseeable
3. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration,
56 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976).
5. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).
6. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
7. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974)
(en banc); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). See
generally Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in
Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979). In Marini v. Ire-
land, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), the court described the implied warranty as follows:
It is a mere matter of semantics whether we designate this covenant one "to repair" or
"of habitability and livability fitness." Actually it is a covenant that at the inception of
the lease, there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the premises for
residential purposes because of faulty original construction or deterioration from age or
normal usage. And further it is a covenant that these facilities will remain in usable
condition during the entire term of the lease. In performance of this covenant the land-
lord is required to maintain those facilities in a condition which renders the property
livable.
Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 529.
8. See Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liability for
Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIZ. L. Rav. 727, 727 n.1 (1979).
9. Henazey and Weisman, What is the Landlord's Responsibility for Criminal Acts
Committed on the Premises?, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 104 (1977).
10. Cases enunciating this general rule include Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill.
App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973); Goldberg v. Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962); DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct.
1965).
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criminal activity."
Although a few opinions mention the expansion of the implied
warranty of habitability to include protection against criminal as-
sault,12 the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decision in
Trentacost v. Brussel contains the first express holding that a
landlord's implied warranty of habitability obliges him to furnish
reasonable safeguards to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal
activity on the premises.13 Thus, Trentacost represents the inter-
face between two rapidly developing lines of authority-the im-
plied warranty of habitability and the landlord's duty in tort to
protect his tenants-and bodes ill for the landlord, who faces diffi-
culty in complying with an ill-defined standard.1 4
This Recent Development traces the evolution of the implied
warranty of habitability and of the duty of the landlord under tort
law to protect his tenants from criminal activity on the leased
premises. The Recent Development then analyzes the courts'
efforts to deal with the potential overlap between these two areas.
The discussion focuses on the New Jersey court's recent and un-
precedented broadening of the implied warranty and the potential
problems faced by landlords and tenants as a result of that
decision.
H. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE DECLINE OF Caveat LESSF
A. The Implied Warranty of Habitability
At common law, the paradigm lease was agrarian in nature
and involved the transfer of land to a tenant who paid the rent
from the proceeds of tilling the soil. Any physical improvements
situated on the land were of secondary importance,13 and it was
therefore appropriate to characterize the lease as a conveyance of
an interest in real property. 6 As a purchaser of real property, the
11. See Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975); Johnston
v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
12. See Part I, section A infra.
13. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
14. See Part IV infra.
15. See generally Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status
to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REv. 369, 371 (1961); Comment, Implied
Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 123 (1971).
16. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, CommNwARmS 317 (Dawson ed. 1966). This characterization
was advantageous to the tenant because it made available to him the real remedy of eject-
ment rather than the contractual action of debt. T. PLucKNmTr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
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lessee was subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor and therefore
took the premises "as is,'1 7 the theory being that the lessee had
the opportunity to inspect the premises for defects before entering
into possession.18 Although the lessor did covenant that he had the
power to transfer possession and that the tenant would be free to
live in "quiet enjoyment" of the leasehold, there was no implied
warranty of habitability or fitness of the premises for the purpose
for which they were leased. " Although the implied covenants of
title and quiet enjoyment were interdependent with the lessee's
covenant to pay rent, any other express covenants, such as one to
repair the premises, were independent of the lessee's rent
obligation.20
This doctrine of caveat lessee was not ill-suited to the six-
teenth and seventeenth century agrarian setting, but with the ad-
vent of the urban leaseholder, the doctrine began to appear singu-
larly outmoded. Unlike the "jack-of-all-trades" farmer who could
make his own repairs, the increasingly mobile city dweller had
neither the funds nor the expertise to do So.2 ' Therefore courts be-
gan to develop exceptions to the harsh caveat lessee doctrine. For
example, the American courts followed their English counterparts2
in recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in the lease of a
furnished house or apartment for a short term; this exception was
based upon the tenant's inability to make an adequate inspection
or to prepare the premises in the short time prior to occupancy.23
COMMON LAW, 599 (5th ed. 1956).
17. The lessee assumed all risks as to the condition of the premises. 2 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 233 (Rohan ed. 1977).
18. See Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 364, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (1887); 1 AmERiCAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
19. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 18, §§ 3.45, .47.
20. The tenant could recover damages and had a defense to an action for rent if either
a paramount title holder or the lessor disturbed his possession of the premises. If, however,
the landlord merely breached his covenant to repair, the lessee had a cause of action for
damages but did not have a defense to his landlord's rent action. Abbott, supra note 3, at 6.
21. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
22. Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843) (lease of furnished house for
approximately five weeks).
23. Ingals v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). The Massachusetts court
stated:
One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and appointments
for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a well-understood
purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An important part of what the hirer pays
for is the opportunity to enjoy it without delay, and without the expense of preparing it
for use.
Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286. American courts have limited the exception to defects present at
1496 [Vol. 33:1493
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Courts held in such cases that the lessor impliedly warranted that
the premises and furnishings were fit for immediate use.2
The second major judicial exception to the caveat lessee
maxim concerned the landlord's fraudulent concealment of a latent
dangerous condition or defect in the premises, known by the land-
lord but not discoverable by the tenant upon reasonably diligent
inspection2 5 The tenant's remedy upon discovery of the defect was
either to vacate the premises and rescind the lease26 or to sue in
tort for injury to his person or property resulting from the defect.27
One of the most important departures from the doctrines of
caveat lessee and independent covenants was the new defense of
constructive eviction.2 8 Basing this doctrine upon an expansion of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, courts held that substantial in-
terference by the lessor with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the
premises constituted a constructive eviction and a breach of the
covenant.2 ' Acts constituting a constructive eviction included
breach of express promises to furnish services such as heat and
water and failure to remedy defective conditions beyond the ten-
ant's capacity to repair.30 A tenant constructively evicted by his
landlord could defend an action for rent and bring an action for
damages, but the utility of the doctrine was diminished by the re-
quirement that the tenant abandon the premises., 1
The final crucial exception to the caveat lessee doctrine was
the inception of the lease. Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947). See
generally Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Premises for
a Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RicH. L. R.v. 322 (1969).
24. See Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
25. E.g., Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1933); Perkins v.
Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
26. See, e.g., Scudder v. Marsh, 224 Il. App. 355 (1922).
27. See, e.g., Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N.E. 117 (1887).
28. See Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1826), rev'g 4 Cow. 581 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1825).
29. A tenant had to establish four prerequisities before he could invoke the doctrine as
a defense to his lessor's action for rent: first, the landlord's act of misfeasance or nonfea-
sance; second, substantial interference with his use and enjoyment of the premises; third,
the landlord's intent to interfere with his quiet possession; and last, his abandonment of the
premises within a reasonable time after the commission of the act. Love, Landlord's Liabil-
ity for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L.
REv. 19, 35-36. See generally Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the
United States, 1 DE PAuL L. Rv. 69 (1951).
30. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) (recurrent flood-
ing); Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 155 A.D. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1913) (rats in walls of
new apartment); Levine v. Baldwin, 87 A.D. 150, 84 N.Y.S. 92 (1903) (drainpipe leaking in
cellar damaged property of tenant).
31. See Love, supra note 29, at 36-37.
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the landlord's duty to repair facilities used in common such as lob-
bies, stairways, elevators, halls, basements, and heating, plumbing,
lighting, and gas systems.3 2 Under this theory, the landlord's pos-
session and control of these common areas justified the imposition
of a duty of reasonable care in maintaining them in a reasonably
safe and fit condition.
Despite the judicially fashioned exceptions to the harsh doc-
trine of caveat lessee, the rule itself was not abrogated until the
1960s. The Minnesota Supreme Court, it is true, held in Delamater
v. Foremanss that there is an implied warranty of habitability in
any lease of an apartment; this decision, if followed elsewhere,
could have initiated a revolutionary trend. Minnesota's example,
however, was not followed until the climate of landlord-tenant law
was receptive to the development of the implied warranty in the
1960s.
Although courts and commentators frequently cite Pines v.
Perssion4 as the initial landmark decision in the warranty area,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court arguably overruled Pines sub silen-
tio in a later decision. 5 Thus, the most persuasive foreshadowing
of the recognition of the implied warranty of habitability came in
1969 with Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper.6 In Reste the Supreme
Court of New Jersey found an implied warranty of habitability in a
five-year commercial lease after a tenant complained of recurrent
flooding that rendered the premises unusable. Although the court
devoted a large portion of its opinion to the tenant's constructive
eviction claim, it affirmed the existence of an "implied warranty
against latent defects.""7 One year later the New Jersey court clari-
fied its position on the warranty issue in Marini v. Ireland,3 8 hold-
32. Id. at 65-66.
33. 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
34. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Pines rejected caveat emptor in favor of
an implied warranty of habitability and the mutual dependence of the tenant's covenant to
pay rent and the landlord's implied covenant to provide a habitable dwelling. The facts of
the case, however, lead to a restrictive interpretation of Pines, since plaintiffs had entered
into a one-year lease of a furnished home. See note 35 infra.
35. In Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970), the court impliedly
restricted the Pines holding by refusing to recognize the defense of housing code violations
in an action for rent.
36. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
37. Id. at 461, 251 A.2d at 277.
38. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). Marini involved a landlord's failure to repair a
cracked and leaking toilet, which the tenant subsequently repaired, deducting the cost from
the next month's rent. The court affirmed the tenant's right to resort to self-help measures
when the landlord has notice of the defect and fails to correct it after a reasonable period of
time.
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WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
ing that a warranty of habitability and livability is implied in all
residential leases.
These innovations of the New Jersey courts precipitated a
number of decisions in the early 1970s that characterized the lease
as a contract containing an implied warranty of habitability that
was interdependent with the covenant to pay rent and enforceable
by contract remedies. 3' Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,40 a
landmark decision in the area and the case most often cited by
other courts, is an appropriate vehicle for a discussion of the ratio-
nale underlying most of the warranty cases.
In Javins a landlord had filed separate actions seeking to evict
three tenants because of their failure to pay rent. The tenants al-
leged in defense that approximately 1500 violations of the Housing
Regulations for the District of Columbia had arisen during the
lease terms. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's judgment for the landlord, holding that a warranty of habi-
tability, measured by the standards in the Housing Regulations, is
implied in the leases of urban dwellings covered by those Regula-
tions, and that breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual reme-
dies for breach of contract.41
The court noted initially that although the characterization of
a lease as a real property conveyance had been reasonable in an
agrarian society, it did not comport with the position of the mod-
ern urban tenant:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they
seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes
not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation,
and proper maintenance.4"
Drawing analogies to the law of sales and residential real es-
tate-areas in which the courts have implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability in order to protect consumers-the court
abandoned the no-repair rule, which, in its view, could not coexist
with the obligations imposed on a landlord by the typical housing
39. See, e.g., Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, Ill Cal. Rptr.
704 (1974) (en banc); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little, 50 Il1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa
1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
40. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
41. Id. at 1072-73.
42. Id. at 1074.
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code.4 s
The court then examined the modern tenant and concluded
that he differed dramatically from the "jack-of-all-trades" farmer
of earlier times who had the skill and financial resources to make
the repairs on his dwelling. The modern urban tenant, the court
observed, usually has only one specialized skill, is highly mobile,
lives in a complex building, and lacks the funds and incentive to
make repairs.44 The Javins court also noted that a severe housing
shortage had created a disparity in bargaining power between
landlord and tenant, and that standardized form leases had be-
come contracts of adhesion offered to tenants on a "take it or leave
it" basis.45
Finally, the Javins court examined the recent legislative dis-
satisfaction with the doctrine of caveat lessee, a displeasure mani-
fested by the widespread enactment of housing codes. The court
cited two District of Columbia Court of Appeals cases that had
similarly used the Housing Regulations to create new legal rights
and duties enforceable in tort by private parties.4" Relying on these
two cases, and on an Illinois case47 that incorporated the existing
building code into a construction contract, the Javins court found
that the Housing Regulations implied a warranty of habitability,
43. Id. at 1076-77. Similarly, other courts have utilized the commercial sales analogy
in employing the warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462
P.2d 470 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
44. 428 F.2d at 1078-79. Other decisions have pointed to this rationale as a basis for
implying a warranty of habitability. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624-
25, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1974) (en banc); King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
45. 428 F.2d at 1079.
46. 428 F.2d at 1080. In Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), the Court of Appeals overturned the common-law no-repair rule and granted the
tenant the right to sue for personal injuries suffered as a result of the landlord's negligent
code violations. Accord, Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In Brown v.
Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968), the court extended the principle of illegal
contract to violations of the housing code, holding that the validity of every lease to which
the housing code applied depended upon substantial compliance with the code at the incep-
tion of the lease term.
The principle of illegal contract referred to in Brown "is that an illegal contract, made
in violation of a statutory prohibition designed for police or regulatory purposes, is void and
confers no right upon the wrongdoer." Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943). A number of District of Columbia cases have recognized
the "illegal contract" theory. See, e.g., William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (D.C.
1970). The theory, however, has gained little recognition in other jurisdictions. But see King
v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289
N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972).
47. Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Mll. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960).
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measured by the standards they set forth, into all leases that they
covered.48
Although most courts have confirmed the policy justifications
articulated in Javins for the recognition of an implied warranty in
residential leases, the decisions evidence great divergence concern-
ing the scope of the warranty and the standard used in its applica-
tion. Like the Javins court, several jurisdictions use the applicable
housing code as one standard, holding that proof of a code viola-
tion with a substantial adverse effect on the tenant's safety or
health is sufficient to establish a breach of the warranty.4' Indeed,
at least one decision has interpreted Javins as holding that the
implied warranty should be measured solely by the standards es-
tablished in the housing code; the court refused to expand the war-
ranty to include defects that failed to violate the code. 0
In contrast to strict reliance on the housing code as a stan-
dard, several courts have taken a broader approach based upon
public policy considerations. These courts examined each case in
light of its particular circumstances in order to determine whether
the defects-whether or not violations of the housing code-are so
substantial that they render the premises unsafe or unsanitary and
therefore unfit for habitation. The strongest statements made
against use of the housing code as the sole standard appear in Bos-
ton Housing Authority v. Hemingway:51
Proof of any violation of [the sanitary and health] regulations would usually
constitute compelling evidence that the apartment was not in a habitable
condition .... However, the protection afforded by the implied warranty of
habitability does not necessarily comply with the Code's requirements. There
may be instances where conditions not covered by the Code regulations
render the apartment uninhabitable.52
48. 428 F.2d at 1082.
49. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974)
(en banc); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IlM. 2d 531, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Boston Hous.
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). Typical viola-
tions include insect or rodent infestation, inadequate room size, light, or ventilation, defec-
tive bathroom fixtures, insufficient hot water, inadequate heating, and inadequate emer-
gency exits. See Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CAL. L. Rav. 1444, 1456 (1974). These cases, however, also recognize
that minor housing code violations alone do not threaten a tenant's health or safety and
therefore do not constitute a breach of the implied warranty. See Javins v. First Nat'l Re-
alty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.63 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("one or
two minor violations standing alone which do not affect habitability are de minimis"); but
see Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974).
50. Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187, 190 (D.C. 1976).
51. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
52. Id. at 844 n.16.
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The broader standard, which typically requires that a breach
of implied warranty be of a nature and kind that will render the
premises unsafe or unsanitary and thus unfit for living, is necessa-
rily more nebulous than the code standard, and therefore lends it-
self to varying interpretations. In an effort to delineate more pre-
cisely the scope of this broader standard, several courts have
identified a list of factors relevant to the question whether the im-
plied warranty has been breached: first, whether the defect consti-
tutes a violation of the housing code; second, the nature and seri-
ousness of the defect; third, the potential or actual impact of the
defect upon safety, sanitation, or habitability; fourth, the length of
time the defect has persisted; fifth, the age of the structure; sixth,
the amount of the rent; and last, whether the tenant is in some
way responsible for the defect or has waived his objection to it.53
The more recent decisions tend to favor this broad approach, using
the housing code either as a minimum standard or as one of many
factors in the determination of breach."
In considering the scope of the implied warranty, most courts
consider the term "defect" to include the landlord's failure to pro-
vide "essential" services, such as hot water5 5 and elevator service.5 6
According to the New Jersey Supreme Court in Berzito v. Gam-
bino, the defect must "truly render the premises uninhabitable in
the eyes of a reasonable person" in order to constitute a breach.5 7
Moreover, the implied warranty generally extends to both latent
and patent defects existing at the beginning of the tenancy,58 and
most courts have found that the warranty imposes a broad, contin-
uing duty on the landlord to make all repairs necessary to main-
tain the premises in a habitable condition, whether the defects ex-
isted at the inception of the lease or arose during the tenancy.5'
Generally speaking, however, the landlord must have notice of the
defective condition and a reasonable time in which to correct the
deficiency before the court will find him guilty of breach of the
53. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63
N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
54. Love, supra note 29, at 107.
55. Winchester Dev. Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976).
56. Academy Spires v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex County Ct.
1970).
57. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22.
58. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56
B.U. L. REv. 1, 14 (1976).
59. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 92. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa
1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
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implied warranty.60 This requirement reflects the courts' reluc-
tance to impose strict liability on the landlord.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, courts have used the
term "habitability" almost exclusively to describe the physical
qualities of the demised premises, such as the adequacy of the
heating and hot water services. In recent years, however, several
jurisdictions have exhibited a willingness to use the term in con-
nection with a landlord's responsibility to provide tenant security.
After reviewing the history of the landlord's duty to protect his
tenants from criminal activity on the premises, this Recent Devel-
opment will examine those cases that have dealt with the conver-
gence of that duty with the expanding scope of the concept of
habitability.
B. The Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal
Activity on the Premises
1. Development of the Duty
Ordinarily, a private person has no duty to protect another
from criminal acts of third parties, absent some special relation-
ship between the first person and the victim. 1 Sections 314A and
320 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts enumerate such special
relationships; they include innkeeper-guest, common carrier-pas-
senger, business invitor-invitee, and custodian-ward. 62 The ratio-
nale for this "special relationship" exception is that the victim has
placed himself under the control and protection of the other party
and has therefore sacrificed his ability to protect himself.6 Conse-
quently, the controlling party is under a duty to protect the depen-
dent person from criminal attack.
Traditionally, courts did not consider the landlord-tenant re-
lationship a special one that imposed upon the landlord a duty to
protect the tenant." Landlord liability generally could arise solely
60. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Heming-
way, 363 Mass. 184, 193 N.E.2d 831, 844 (1972); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d
526, 535 (1970). Courts will waive the notice requirement if the landlord knew or should
have known of defects present at the commencement of lease. See Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
61. Harper & Kine, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886
(1934); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971).
62. RESTATEmrNT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 320 (1966).
63. See Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 196, 186 S.W.
87, 89 (1916); 55 MINN. L. Rsv. 1097, 1098.
64. See, e.g., Teall v. Harlow, 275 Mass. 448, 452, 176 N.E. 533, 535 (1931); McCappin
v. Park Capitol Corp., 42 N.J. Super. 169, 172, 126 A.2d 51, 52 (1956).
1980] 1503
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
from the breach of a contractual or statutory obligation or upon a
showing that negligence constituted the proximate cause of the
loss. 5 For example, the court in Tirado v. Labarsky6 6 found that a
landlord was not under a duty to anticipate the criminal act of a
third person, even though the landlord's failure to repair the front
door lock on the tenant's apartment was arguably the proximate
cause of the assault upon the tenant. The main reason for the fail-
ure of plaintiff's argument in Tirado and other similar cases is that
the courts regarded the intervening criminal activity as a supersed-
ing cause that relieved the landlord from liability.'7
Injured plaintiffs have used several arguments, some more suc-
cessful than others, in an attempt to circumvent this restrictive
definition of landlord liability. In Williams v. William J. Davis,
Inc.58 and in New York City Housing Authority v. Medlin te-
nants argued that the terms "safe" and "safety" in certain statutes
and housing regulations included freedom from the criminal acts of
third parties. Both courts rejected this argument, however, reason-
ing that such statutes or regulations referred exclusively to physi-
cal deficiencies of the premises, such as fire hazards, sanitary inad-
equacies, and structural defects.
The most important development in the movement to abro-
gate the doctrine of landlord immunity in this area has been the
recognition of the landlord's duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect his tenants against foreseeable criminal acts of third par-
ties. The breach of this duty would subject the landlord to liability
in tort.70 Proponents of this rule argue that the landlord's duty to
repair and maintain the safe condition of common areas under his
control should extend to the implementation of security measures,
65. See Kendall v. Gore Properties, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Smith v. ABC Re-
alty Co., 66 Misc. 2d 276, 322 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
66. 49 Misc. 2d 543, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Civ. Ct.), affd, 52 Misc. 2d 527, 276 N.Y.S.2d
128 (App. Term 1966).
67. See Freezer & Favor, Intervening Crime and Liability for Negligence, 24 MINN. L.
REv. 635 (1946).
68. 275 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1971).
69. 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291 N.Y.S. 672 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
70. This development is closely related to the relatively successful argument that land-
lords have a duty to protect against negligent acts of third persons-an argument similarly
based on the well-established duty of the landlord to keep common areas that are controlled
by him in a reasonably safe condition. See Mayer v. Housing Auth., 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202
A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964) (landlord's failure to provide adequate protection subjected him
to liability for playground injury caused by third party); DaRocha v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 282 App. Div. 728, 122 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1953) (child injured in playground by third
party).
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not simply to the repair of physical defects, since the means of
crime prevention available to a tenant are limited.71
As early as 1969 courts began to accept tenants' arguments
that a landlord was obligated to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances with respect to the prevention, deterrence, and con-
trol of foreseeable criminal conduct within the common areas of an
apartment building. For example, in Ramsay v. Morrissette," a
tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained in an assault by an
intruder who forced his way into her apartment. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that the tenant's allegations that
the landlord was negligent in, inter alia, failing to install a lock on
the front door and failing to prevent strangers from sleeping in the
hallways were sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of
the landlord.73
Similarly, in Johnston v. Harris74 the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan held that a tenant who was assaulted in an apartment vesti-
bule could maintain an action against his landlord on the theory
that the landlord's negligent failure to provide adequate lighting
and locks created a condition conducive to criminal assaults.75 A
New York court also interpreted the definition of proximate cause
liberally in Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp.,76 in which a ten-
ant sued his landlord for injuries inflicted by a criminal who alleg-
edly entered the apartment lobby through a door with a broken
lock. Emphasizing the facts that the landlord had actual
knowledge of criminal activity in the area and had increased the
rent in order to provide a bell and buzzer system to protect against
intruders, the court held that the intervening criminal assault did
not preclude consideration of whether the injury was proximately
caused by the landlord's negligence in failing to repair the lock.
Courts in New Jersey and Maryland have also adopted the
"enhanced risk plus foreseeability" theory of Johnston and Sher-
man, stating that a breach of duty by a landlord would be the
proximate cause of the injury if the breach enhanced the likelihood
of occurrence of particular criminal activity.7 7 The Maryland court
71. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969).
73. Id. at 512-13.
74. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
75. The court found that "in a high crime district it is reasonably foreseeable that
inadequate lighting and unlocked doors would create conditions to which criminals would be
attracted to carry out their nefarious deeds." Id. at 573, 198 N.W.2d at 410.
76. 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975).
77. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace,
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broadly stated in Scott v. Watson that
[i]f the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity against persons
or property in the common areas, he then has a duty to take reasonable mea-
sures, in view of the existing circumstances, to eliminate the conditions con-
tributing to the criminal activity.78
In contrast to the cases discussed above, several courts have
been less inclined to recognize a landlord's duty to provide safe
and secure premises; they have based their holdings primarily on
the concept of superseding cause. Thus, in DeKoven v. 780 West
End Realty Co. 9 the court found that failure to provide round-
the-clock doorman service was not the proximate cause of injury to
tenants from crime perpetrated by third parties on the premises.
Similarly, in Hall v. Fraknois° the court suggested that the perva-
siveness of crime in the modern city made it virtually impossible to
establish a causal connection between the presence or absence of a
door lock or buzzer system and the crimes committed on the prem-
ises. According to the court in Goldberg v. Housing Authority,1
anyone "can foresee the commission of crime virtually anywhere
and at any time. '8 2 Therefore, in the court's view, whether or not
an unknown criminal would have been deterred by additional po-
lice protection for a public housing project was mere conjecture.
At least two decisions have denied recovery to tenants on the
grounds that a landlord's responsibility for the condition of the
common areas within his control encompasses only the obligation
to maintain and repair, not the duty to police. In Trice v. Chicago
Housing Authority8 the court found that a landlord, though aware
of the risk of injury, did not have a duty to protect his tenant from
the intentional and criminally reckless act of another tenant in
throwing a television set over a railing. According to the court, to
impose such a vague standard upon landlords would be to trans-
form them into insurers against criminally reckless acts of third
persons whenever some form of notice was proved. 4 The Supreme
Court of Virginia in Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers85 also noted that
68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
78. 278 Md. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554.
79. 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
80. 69 Misc. 2d 470, 336 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972); accord, Smith v. ABC Realty
Co., 71 Misc. 2d 284, 336 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Term 1972).
81. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
82. Id. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293.
83. 14 Il. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973).
84. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 210.
85. 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974).
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the landlord's duty did not include providing police protection; his
only obligation was to maintain the areas over which he has control
in good repair and free of latent defects.""
As evidenced by the above discussion, courts are divided on
the issue of the landlord's liability to tenants injured by criminal
acts committed by third parties on the premises. The trend, how-
ever, appears to be in favor of the imposition of a duty to protect,
based primarily upon the traditional notion that the landlord is
responsible for the maintenance and safe condition of common ar-
eas under his control. Two decisions by courts in the District of
Columbia and New Jersey-the two jurisdictions most often in the
forefront of landlord-tenant reform-symbolize this trend and also
set the stage for the recent dramatic change wrought by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey.
8 7
2. Kline and Braitman: Precedent for Change
Courts and commentators frequently cite Kline v. 1500 Mas-
sachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.5 as the leading case regard-
ing the landlord's responsibility for tenant security. In Kline, the
tenant was injured when she was criminally assaulted and robbed
in the common hallway of her apartment building. Despite a rise in
the crime rate in the neighborhood and a significant increase in
crime in the building itself, the landlord had decreased the guard
and doorway services that were available at the beginning of the
lease term. The court held that a landlord was obligated "to take
steps to protect tenants from the foreseeable criminal acts commit-
ted by third parties,"89 reasoning that a landlord was in a better
position than a tenant to guard against the foreseeable risk of en-
trance by criminal intruders.
Although the Kline court's analysis synthesized several differ-
ent bodies of law, the basis for the decision is somewhat ambigu-
ous. The primary rationale for the Kline holding appears to be an
extension of developing tort principles to the concept of liability
for failure to protect one's tenants. The court noted the landlord's
duty to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe physical con-
86. The primary basis for the court's holding, however, was the fact that prior activi-
ties by trespassers on the premises were noncriminal in nature; thus, the act of criminal
violence involved in the case could not have been reasonably foreseen. Id. at 159, 207 S.E.2d
at 845.
87. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
88. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
89. Id. at 477.
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dition and reasoned that, since the landlord retained control over
these areas and was the only party with the power to provide pro-
tection, this duty should extend to protection of tenants from
criminal attack.90 The court also used the landlord's duty to re-
pair-and his liability in tort for breach of that duty-to support
its holding by analogy. Comparing the landlord-tenant relationship
to that of an innkeeper and his guest, the court opined that be-
cause the tenant had in a sense submitted to the control of the
landlord he had limited his ability to provide for his own protec-
tion. Thus, the court concluded that the landlord, who possessed
control and the power to act, was responsible for taking reasonable
precautions to protect his tenants from attacks that were "foresee-
able" in the sense that they were "probable" and "predictable." 91
The Kline court also attempted, not altogether successfully, to
elaborate an alternative rationale for its holding. The court cited
Javins for the proposition that the lease of an urban dwelling had
increasingly been viewed as a contract for "a well known package
of goods and services," including "secure windows and doors. '9 2 In
light of the recognition in Javins of an implied "obligation on the
landlord to provide those protective measures which are within his
reasonable capacity," 93 the following paragraph is particularly
perplexing:
The.. .tenant was entitled to performance by the landlord. . . whether the
landlord's obligation be viewed as grounded in contract or in tort ....
[T]his standard of protection was implied as an obligation of the lease con-
tract from the beginning. Likewise, on a tort basis, this standard. . . may be
taken as that commonly provided in apartments of this character and type in
this community. . ..
It seems that the court outlined a tort duty of reasonable care
as a minimum below which the landlord's conduct could not fall
and then added a contractual element by suggesting that the ten-
ant might be entitled to extra protection if he had impliedly con-
tracted for it at the inception of the lease.9 5
In contradistinction to the apparent dual analysis in Kline,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Braitman v. Overlook Ter-
90. Id. at 481.
91. Id. at 483.
92. 428 F.2d at 1074.
93. 439 F.2d at 485.
94. Id. at 486.
95. Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 275, 285 n.80 (1971).
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race Corp.96 based its holding solely on traditional negligence prin-
ciples. The Braitmans sued their landlord for property loss sus-
tained when their apartment was burglarized following failure of
the landlord to repair a defective deadbolt lock. Although the te-
nants had complained repeatedly about the defective lock and had
received assurances from the landlord that the repair would be
made, the landlord had made no attempt to fix the lock. 7
After acknowledging the traditional view that the landlord-
tenant relationship does not, without more, impose a duty upon
the landlord to protect his tenants from crime, the court noted
that cases in other jurisdictions had expanded the scope of the
landlord's duty with respect to security.9 8 The court cited Kline as
the leading case in the area, but neither accepted nor rejected ex-
plicitly the rationale of that opinion. Rather, the court turned to
the traditional negligence principles adopted in the New Jersey
cases. Restricting Goldberg9" to the proposition that police protec-
tion is the duty of government and not of the owner of a housing
project, and noting Goldberg's caveat that a landlord might be lia-
ble if he carelessly enables a thief to enter a tenant's apartment,100
the court proceeded to examine the foreseeability and proximate
cause issues. Several New Jersey cases lent support to the proposi-
tion that negligence liability was not necessarily precluded by rea-
sonably foreseeable criminal activity,10 1 and that the key to duty,
negligence, and proximate cause was the foreseeability of an unrea-
sonably enhanced hazard.102 The court concluded that, in light of
prior break-ins in the neighborhood of the Braitmans' building, a
reasonable person would have foreseen the enhanced risk created
by a faulty security device and, after notice of the defect, would
have supplied adequate locks.103
96. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
97. Id. at 371-72, 346 A.2d at 77-78. As the trial court noted, the landlord had, how-
ever, taken other security measures to protect the tenants, such as posting a security guard
and installing an inter-communications system. 132 N.J. Super. 51, 54, 332 A.2d 212, 213
(App. Div. 1974).
98. 68 N.J. at 374, 376-78. For example, the court discussed the decisions in Johnston
v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972) and Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174,
210 S.E.2d 350 (1974).
99. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 241 (1962). See text accompany-
ing note 82 supra.
100. 38 N.J. at 588.
101. Genovay v. Fox, 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 29 N.J. 436, 149 A.2d 212 (1959).
102. Zinck v. Whelan, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (App. Div. 1972).
103. 68 N.J. at 382-83, 346 A.2d at 84. The court added an alternative rationale for its
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Three justices issued a "word of caution" in a separate section
of the majority opinion,0 although they concurred in the conclu-
sion that the lower court's judgment had to be affirmed by "resort-
ing to familiar negligence concepts." 10 5 The three justices observed
that, in light of the rising crime rate and the population shift to-
ward multi-family dwellings, future decisions might impose a con-
tractual duty upon landlords to take reasonable precautions for
the protection of tenants. Whether based on the landlord's supe-
rior ability to take precautions, or on an expanded notion of the
implied warranty of habitability, the predicted development would
obviate the necessity of relying exclusively upon negligence princi-
ples to establish landlord liability.106
Thus, although Braitman stopped short of expanding the con-
cept of "habitability" to include safety from criminal attack, it
clearly foreshadowed that expansion, which finally materialized al-
most five years later.
III. THE CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTS: Trentacost v. Brussel
AND THE "WARRANTY OF SECURITY"
A. Precedent
Although courts have wrought revolutionary changes in land-
lord-tenant law in the last decade by implying a warranty of habit-
ability and by expanding the tort liability of the landlord for negli-
gence in maintaining common areas, few courts have considered
the relationship between these two distinct developments with re-
spect to residential security. "Habitability" has usually referred to
the physical quality of the premises, and any duty to protect te-
nants from criminal attack has been based on traditional concepts
of duty, foreseeability, and proximate cause.
Those courts that have recognized the possible overlap of
holding, stating that the landlord's failure to provide an operable deadbolt in violation of a
state regulation was a circunstance to be considered by the trier of fact in determining
liability, although it was not conclusive on the issue. Id. at 383-86, 346 A.2d at 84-86.
104. Id. at 386, 346 A.2d at 86.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 387-88, 346 A.2d at 86-87. The justices noted that resort to the implied
warranty theory would require a re-consideration of Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123
N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div.), aff'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973), in
which the court limited the implied warranty of habitability to the context of rent abate-
ment and eviction, refusing to apply it to personal injury action. In a separate concurring
opinion, Justices Clifford and Schreiber affirmed the decision on the basis of traditional
negligence principles, but disavowed any attempt to rely upon a doctrine that expands the
landlord's duty with respect to tenant security. 68 N.J. at 388, 346 A.2d at 87.
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these trends have reached differing conclusions. Several courts
have disregarded or minimized the overlap. In Hall v. Fraknoi07
the court observed that an implied warranty of habitability and an
implied warranty against the criminal acts of third persons were
not precisely the same, and it expressed doubt that the expecta-
tions of the parties to a lease included a landlord's duty to protect
his tenants.108 The court noted further that the landlord's control
of common areas was customarily associated with the obligation to
maintain and repair, rather than with a duty to police. 09 An Illi-
nois appellate court adopted the same position in Trice v. Chicago
Housing Authority,'" stating that an implied warranty of habita-
bility and an implied warranty against criminal acts were not the
same and noting that the duty to police was not a traditional facet
of the landlord's duty to maintain common areas."' The court also
limited the Kline decision to its facts, noting that the high level of
security present at the inception of the lease and the significant
decrease in security during the tenancy were important factors in
the decision." 2 Interestingly, Justice Hayes filed a special concur-
ring opinion in Trice; he expressed a willingness to expand the im-
plied warranty to encompass the provision of security, but only
when a tenant used a breach of the warranty as a shield to justify
the withholding of rent in an action for forcible entry and detainer.
Justice Hayes, however, would not support the use of the expanded
warranty as a weapon in an action for money damages for wrongful
death. He reasoned that the vast economic and social consequences
of such an action called for reform by the legislature and not the
judiciary.1n
In Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments"' the Supreme Court of New
Jersey refused to expand the implied warranty of habitability be-
yond the context of rent abatement and eviction. In an action to
107. 69 Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
108. The court opined that "the implication of a warranty of security may be the
product of a desire to deal with the crisis presently posed by criminal activity rather than
one that is derived from the expectations that are implicit when the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship is created." According to the court, the imposition of such a police function upon
landlords as an implication of the landlord-tenant relationship is a matter for the legisla-
ture, not the courts. 330 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
109. Id.
110. 14 IMI. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973).
111. Id. at 100, 302 N.E.2d at 209.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 102-03, 302 N.E.2d at 211 (Hayes, J., specially concurring).
114. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div.) aff'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1
(1973).
19801 1511
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
recover for personal injuries resulting from a defective hot water
faucet, the tenant argued that the landlord's breach of the implied
warranty enunciated in Marini"5 would give rise to tort liability.
The court rejected this argument, holding that the implied war-
ranty in Marini "was not intended to overturn existing principles
of law applicable to tort actions for personal injuries by tenants
versus landlords. 11 6 Although Dwyer did not concern a landlord's
liability for criminal acts committed by third parties, three justices
in Braitman recognized that any decision to expand the implied
warranty to include protection against such acts would necessarily
involve a reconsideration of the Dwyer holding. " The Braitman
court, however, refused to decide the issue.
Other decisions have been more receptive to the establishment
of some correlative relationship between the implied warranty of
habitability and the landlord's tort liability for injuries on the
premises. For example, in Sargent v. Ross" 8 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated that recognition of the tort liability "springs
naturally and inexorably from" the recognition of the implied war-
ranty.11 9 According to the court, the logical extension of the land-
lord's duty to make the premises suitable for their intended use
was a duty to remedy negligently created safety hazards.2 0
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.1 21 is
the strongest precedent for extension of the implied warranty of
habitability to include the duty to provide security to tenants. Sev-
eral commentators, however, have noted that the Kline opinion is
ambiguous, in that it is unclear whether the court grounded its
holding on contract or tort theory.1 22 Moreover, the court's use of
the implied warranty theory has been criticized as "unnecessary
and inadequately reasoned."'22 The factual context of the Kline
case is also conducive to a restrictive interpretation of its holding.
When the tenant signed her lease, a round-the-clock doorman was
on duty at the main entrance, and another employee manned the
lobby desk. Two garage attendants were stationed at the dual en-
tranceway to the building and to the parking garage, and a side
115. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
116. 123 N.J. Super. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466.
117. See note 106 supra.
118. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
119. Id. at 396, 308 A.2d at 533.
120. Id. at 397-98, 308 A.2d at 534.
121. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
122. See Comment, supra note 95, at 276; text accompanying notes 90-95 supra.
123. 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 943, 952 (1970).
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entrance was locked at 9:00 p.m. By the time of the assault, how-
ever, the main entrance had no doorman, the desk was usually un-
attended, and two side entrances were usually unguarded and un-
locked. This decrease in security was accompanied by an increase
in the number of assaults and robberies committed in the common
areas of the building.1 24 If the Kline duty to protect was actually a
duty only to maintain existing security measures, then Kline did
not really impose any new obligations on a landlord; instead, it
merely held him liable under traditional notions of misfeasance. 12 5
The Kline opinion is similarly unclear on the standard of care
required of a landlord. The court articulated a typical tort stan-
dard of "reasonable care in all the circumstances, 1 26 yet cited with
approval the Javins case, in which "habitability" was determined
solely by reference to the housing regulations. Kline could conceiv-
ably be interpreted as holding that a landlord need only provide
protective services comparable to those available at the inception
of the lease, because such services and no others were implied in
the lease contract. 27 If the court did intend to extend the implied
warranty to include a duty to protect tenants against reasonably
foreseeable criminal activity, it certainly failed to articulate an un-
ambiguous rule.
B. Trentacost v. Brussel
In Trentacost v. Brussel2 8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
forthrightly synthesized two of the most important developments
in landlord-tenant law-the implied warranty of habitability and
the emerging duty of the landlord to protect his tenants from fore-
seeable criminal atack. Trentacost involved a 61-year-old woman
who sustained injuries when she was assaulted and robbed in the
124. 439 F.2d at 479.
125. See Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenant's Private Law Rights: Implied Warran-
ties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 489, 503
(1971). Several courts have distinguished Kline or have limited it severely. See, e.g., Trice v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100, 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1973) (Kline applies only
when tenant relies on initial security measures which are subsequently reduced); Gulf
Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974) (Kline applies only to
large urban apartments and when landlord has notice of criminal activity and reduces
security).
126. 439 F.2d at 485.
127. The court stated that "[w]e do hold that the same relative degree of security
should have been maintained." 439 F.2d at 486 (emphasis added). A possible consequence of
this holding may be that landlords have an incentive to provide no security measures at the
beginning of the lease term.
128. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
1980] 1513
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
common stairway of her apartment building. A padlock secured
the rear entrance to the building, but there was no lock on the
front door, which plaintiff and apparently her assailant had used
to enter the premises. 129 There was evidence of criminal activity in
the neighborhood; moreover, Mrs. Trentacost had reported to the
landlord an attempt to break into the basement of the building
only two months prior to her "mugging." She also claimed that the
landlord had promised to install a lock on the front door, although
he denied having any such discussion.130
In affirming the Appellate Division's judgment for the ten-
ant, 3' the supreme court focused initially on the Braitman deci-
sion, which the lower court had considered controlling. The court
noted that Braitman had cited with approval the Kline case,
which, in the view of the Trentacost court, drew on "an implied
contractual undertaking to maintain those protective measures in
effect at the beginning of the lease term" as an alternative ground
for its imposition of liability.132 The court, however, reiterated that
the Braitman holding rested on traditional negligence principles of
duty, foreseeability, and the creation of an unreasonably enhanced
risk of criminal activity. In the court's view, application of these
principles supported affirmance of plaintiff's judgment, because
the evidence supported the conclusion that the "mugging" was a
foreseeable result of the landlord's negligent failure to supply a
lock on the front entrance.1 3 3
Nothing thus far in the court's opinion represents any radical
departure from existing law. Next, however, the court took the op-
portunity "to clarify the scope of a residential landlord's duty to
his tenant" and to deal with the alternative theories discussed in
Braitman.&" It began with a discussion of the modern urban ten-
ant's definition of a habitable dwelling, which included, at a mini-
mum, "proper security and maintenance. 1 3 5 After detailing some
of the more persuasive reasons for its imposition of an implied
129. Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 438.
130. Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 439.
131. 164 N.J. Super. 9, 395 A.2d 540 (App. Div. 1978).
132. 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 440. The court mentioned the fact that a majority in
Braitman did not embrace the reasoning of Kline. Id.
133. 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 441.
134. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra. The court cited New Jersey precedent
to support its conscious choice to decide issues that need not have been decided, although
the court believed that a decision was "warranted." 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 441, citing
Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 363-64, 307 A.2d 571, 578, app. denied, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973).
135. 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 442.
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warranty of habitability, such as the housing shortage and the in-
ability of tenants to maintain common areas of their apartments,
the court reaffirmed its holding in Marini, which extended the im-
plied warranty to all "facilities vital to the use of the premises for
residential purposes." 136 The court then proclaimed that, in view of
the omnipresence of crime in our society, "facilities vital to the use
of the premises" included provisions for a tenant's security. The
court next went beyond Braitman by holding unequivocally that
"the landlord's implied warranty of habitability obliges him to fur-
nish reasonable safeguards to protect tenants from foreseeable
criminal activity on the premises" and that the landlord breached
that warranty by failing to secure the front door of the building. 37
Perhaps even more of a departure from precedent was the court's
holding that the implied undertaking to provide security exists in-
dependently of the landlord's knowledge of any risks, so that it is
not necessary to prove notice of an unsafe condition in order to
find the landlord in breach of his duty; the mere fact that the land-
lord failed to take reasonable measures for maintaining a habitable
dwelling was sufficient.138 In effect, the court in Trentacost im-
posed a duty to provide adequate security based solely upon the
landlord-tenant relationship itself.
IV. ANALYSIS
The prediction of three justices in Braitman v. Overlook Ter-
race Corp.1s9 became a reality in Trentacost v. Brussel. Justice
Pushman wrote both the prescient trio's opinion in Braitman and
the Trentacost opinion; in the latter case, he apparently convinced
at least three other justices that the plight of the urban tenant
warranted an extension of the implied warranty to include the
landlord's duty to protect tenants against reasonably foreseeable
criminal activity. Three justices, however, refused to support this
extension and affirmed the judgment solely on the basis of tradi-
136. Id. at -, 412 A.2d at 442-43 (quoting Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265
A.2d 526, 534 (1970)).
137. 82 N.J. at , 412 A.2d at 443. The court defined "premises" to include the com-
mon areas of multiple dwellings. Id.
138. Id. The court concluded its analysis with a discussion of the landlord's violation
of New Jersey's multiple dwelling regulation, finding that the violation constituted evidence
of the defendant's negligence. 82 N.J. at , 412 A.2d at 443-45. Although all seven justices
affirmed the judgment for the tenant, three justices disagreed with the "majority" implied
warranty theory, preferring to limit the basis for the holding to traditional negligence princi-
ples. 82 N.J. at _ 412 A.2d at 445-47 (separate opinions of Schreiber, J. and Clifford, J.).
139. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
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tional negligence principles. 140 The fact that the Trentacost court
was divided, however, does not reduce the impact of the case upon
landlord-tenant law. In Trentacost, the New Jersey Supreme
Court expanded Kline to its full revolutionary potential. At first
blush, this extension of the implied warranty appears to bode ill
for the landlord and to constitute a substantial step in the ad-
vancement of the urban tenant's rights. Further inspection, how-
ever, reveals that even the tenant may be adversely affected by this
attempt to merge two of the most significant trends in landlord-
tenant law.
Trentacost imposed upon the landlord a duty to protect his
tenants; yet the court failed to delineate with any clarity the scope
of that duty or the standards by which a landlord's conduct was to
be evaluated. At various points in its opinion, the court spoke of "a
reasonable measure of security," "appropriate security devices,"
"reasonable safeguards," "some measure of security," and "ade-
quate security," 4 yet the court neither defined any of these terms
nor even attempted to give an example of what types of security
might comply with this vague standard. Thus, the landlord must
decide, for instance, whether the warranty of habitability requires
him to hire a twenty-four hour guard service or to install deadbolt
locks on all the doors to the building. The implied warranty recog-
nized in Javins was measured by the applicable housing code,
which provided some certainty. In Kline the court established a
standard of "reasonable care in all the circumstances,"1 2 but it
provided guideposts for determining whether a landlord has met
the standard. These guideposts were "the protection commonly
provided in apartments of this character and type in this commu-
nity"148 (apparently a tort standard) and "the same relative degree
of security"1 44 provided by the landlord at the commencement of
the lease term (apparently a contract standard).
The court's failure in Trentacost to provide a clear standard
places the landlord in an untenable position. Perhaps a better ap-
proach would have been to delineate certain factors to be used in
the determination of liability, similar to those enumerated in war-
ranty cases dealing with physical defects in the premises. 145 Courts
140. See note 138 supra.
141. 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 443.
142. 439 F.2d at 485.
143. Id. at 486.
144. Id.
145. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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have traditionally considered the amount of rent, the nature of the
deficiency, whether it affects a vital facility, the potential or actual
effect upon safety, the age of the structure, and the design and
location of the structure.146 Additional factors in tenant security
cases should include the incidence of crime and the availability of
police in the neighborhood, and, more importantly, the security
measures in force when the tenant signed the lease, because the
tenant would reasonably expect and rely upon such measures. The
latter, however, is only one factor in the determination; if a court
assigns it too much weight, landlords might fail to provide any
protection against criminal interlopers, thus forestalling any claim
of expectation or reliance upon security measures implied in the
lease.
Unlike Kline,1 47 Trentacost made virtually no attempt to use a
tort standard of reasonable protection to delineate the scope of the
implied contractual obligation. True, the court used the words
"reasonable" and "foreseeable," but these terms are meaningless in
the absence of a notice requirement. The court seemed to hold that
the mere relationship of landlord and tenant imposed a duty on
the landlord to safeguard the tenant from crime. In the traditional
special relationship cases, courts have relied heavily on the element
of foreseeability in determining whether one person has violated
his duty to protect another. Yet foreseeability is intimately related
to the concept of notice. A landlord should be under no duty to
provide safety measures if he has no notice-actual or construc-
tive-of the probability that crimes will result from some defective
or unsafe condition.1 48 Of course, the landlord is a "reasonably pru-
dent person" who will be liable if he should have known that the
condition of the premises aggravated the risk of criminal activity.
The Trentacost court, however, boldly stated that "the landlord's
implied undertaking exists independently of his knowledge of any
risks." Therefore, it eliminates the need to prove notice of an un-
safe condition,149 and the fact that a landlord failed to take "mea-
sures which were in fact reasonable for maintaining a habitable
residence" would be sufficient. 150 Habitability includes the furnish-
ing of "appropriate" or "adequate" or "reasonable" security de-
146. See Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
147. See text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
148. Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Parties:
The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEo. L. J. 1153, 1178 (1971).
149. 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 443.
150. Id.
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vices. The court, then, has led the landlord in a circular path in an
attempt to define the scope of this newly minted obligation. Rather
than solving the problems raised by Kline, Trentacost raises a
myriad of new ones.
If, for example, the court intended by its use of the terms
"reasonable" and "foreseeable" to imply a tort standard of care
similar to that in Kline,151 one wonders whether a slumlord is
obliged to provide only those protective measures applied by other
landlords in equally uninhabitable tenements. Conversely, if a
landlord provides no protection at the moment a tenant signs his
lease, and puts the tenant on notice that no protection is exactly
what he has bargained for, but other buildings of similar character
provide adequate security, does the tenant have a remedy when he
is assaulted on the premises?
The Trentacost court failed to realize that the effect of its de-
cision was to impose strict liability on the landlord. One of the
main purposes of the notice requirement in warranty actions is to
prevent the imposition of liability without fault, yet the court elim-
inated that requirement as an element of a plaintiff's proof. Thus,
Trentacost actually imposes twin duties upon the landlord-the
duty to investigate or inquire and the duty to protect. A landlord
must now investigate and maintain a watchful eye to see whether
any locks have been broken or whether any other conditions of the
premises may be conducive to criminal activity. He must have the
prescience to know whether a criminal act is probable and to know
what measures a court would consider reasonable for deterring
such an act.
Although the "package of goods and services" referred to in
Javins may be reasonably thought to include protection and secur-
ity, implication of a "warranty of security" is not a panacea for the
plight of the urban tenant, and Trentacost fails to deal with the
possible ramifications of its holding. First, characterization of the
landlord's duty as one grounded in contract rather than in tort
may result in the imposition of traditional contract limitations on
the money damages recoverable by an injured tenant. The court
does not discuss whether a landlord's breach of the implied war-
ranty would give the tenant a cause of action in tort in addition to
his action ex contractu.1 52 Although Javins extended all contract
remedies for breach to the parties to a lease, including an action
151. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
152. See generally Comment, supra note 95, at 286-88.
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for specific performance of the landlord's implied warranty,153 it
remains unclear whether Trentacost contemplates the full availa-
bility of such remedies even if the tenant has sustained no physical
injury. The new-found ability to sue for breach of the broadened
warranty may engender litigation by tenants who seek, in effect, a
declaratory judgment that their landlords have not provided them
with "reasonable" security.
Second, as one commentator has astutely observed, use of a
contract theory of liability may adversely affect the protection af-
forded a landlord by his liability insurance.154 Although most gen-
eral liability policies cover liability for a landlord's negligence, they
exclude from coverage any contract entered into by a landlord that
broadens his legal liability.
Third, the expansion of the implied warranty of habitability to
include the duty to provide adequate security could have tremen-
dous economic impact-both on the tenant and on the urban hous-
ing market. Although it seems logical that the landlord, who main-
tains control over the common areas of the building, is in a better
position to take the necessary protective steps, in reality the in-
creased costs of providing such security will probably be passed on
to the tenants. The crime-ridden sections of today's urban areas
are inhabited by those who are least able to afford an increase in
rent.155 In addition, landlords who are subject to rent ceilings and
who already operate at low profit margins may not be able to ab-
sorb the costs of increased security. Consequently, they may aban-
don their buildings and accelerate the decay of urban housing
stock. Such a result could only aggravate the problem of the secur-
ity of the low income tenant and exacerbate the present housing
crisis.
As Judge Goodell observed in Hall v. Fraknoi,15" the implica-
tion of a "warranty of security" may be the result of a desire to
respond to the current high incidence of crime rather than a result
153. 428 F.2d at 1082 n.61.
154. Comment, supra note 95, at 290.
155. The Goldberg court posited the following scenario:
If the owner must provide that service, every insurance carrier will insist that he do it.
The bill will be paid, not by the owner, but by the tenants. And if, as we apprehend,
the incidence of crime is greatest in the area in which the poor must live, they, and
they alone, will be singled out to pay for their own policy protection. The burden
should be on the whole community-and not upon the segment of the citizenry which
is least able to bear it.
38 N.J. at 591, 186 A.2d at 298.
156. 69 Misc. 2d 470, 472-73, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
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derived from the expectations of the parties when the landlord-
tenant relationship is created. The court in Trentacost has essen-
tially enacted welfare legislation by judicial fiat, without consider-
ing the possible ramifications of its enactment. Justice Clifford,
who dissented in part from the Trentacost majority, argued co-
gently for the continued use of traditional negligence principles as
opposed to the imposition of "absolute liability solely upon the re-
lationship between the landlord and tenant and upon loose notions
of foreseeability. '1 57 Citing Goldberg, Judge Clifford advocated a
"fair balancing" of the relative interests of the parties, the nature
of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed answer to the
inquiry.158 Such arguments become increasingly persuasive when
one considers the lack of guidance given to a landlord by the ma-
jority opinion in Trentacost.
Perhaps the best solution to the seemingly insoluble problem
is the enactment by the legislature of a statute specifically requir-
ing a bare minimum of security measures in all leased residential
housing of a certain type and character. Such a statute would serve
the same function as that served by the Housing Code in the
Javins opinion. 5 9 Courts could then take the approach adopted by
the court in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,'6 0 using the
statute as a threshold requirement which all housing must meet
but not as an exclusive list of those defects or conditions that
would render a landlord liable for breach of warranty.161 Such min-
imum requirements as safe locks on all main entrances and a bell
or buzzer system would provide the landlord with some knowledge
of the limits of his duty while restricting the large gray area cre-
ated by the Trentacost opinion. More importantly, indigent te-
nants would be provided with at least a minimum of protection
against criminal activity, instead of that lack of protection existing
in other similar slum areas.
V. CONCLUSION
In some respects the New Jersey Supreme Court's broad ex-
pansion of the implied warranty of habitability to include the duty
to provide reasonable security is the logical and inevitable conse-
quence of the convergence of two rapidly developing trends in
157. 82 N.J. at -, 412 A.2d at 446-47 (Clifford, J., dissenting in part).
158. Id.
159. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
160. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
161. 363 Mass. 184, 200 n.16, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16 (1973).
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landlord-tenant law. Yet, four members of the court appear to
have taken this revolutionary step without considering the possible
detrimental consequences to both the landlord and the tenant,
whom they were trying to protect. The court has placed the land-
lord "perilously close to the position of insurer of his tenants'
safety".16 2 Whether other courts will follow the lead of the New
Jersey court is unknown, but those that do should delineate more
clearly the scope of this new duty to protect the tenant from crimi-
nal activity that is inherently unpredictable.
CAROLINE HUDSON
162. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 167, 359 A.2d 548, 553 (1976).
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